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Abstract 
A large literature suggests that European settlement outside of Europe shaped institutional, 
educational, technological, cultural, and economic outcomes. This literature has had a serious 
gap: no direct measure of colonial European settlement. In this paper, we (1) construct a new 
database on the European share of the population during the early stages of colonization and (2) 
examine its impact on the level of economic development today. We find a remarkably strong 
impact of colonial European settlement on development. According to one illustrative exercise, 
47 percent of average global development levels today are attributable to Europeans. One of our 
most surprising findings is the positive effect of even a small minority European population 
during the colonial period on per capita income today, contradicting traditional and recent views. 
There is some evidence for an institutional channel, but our findings are most consistent with 
human capital playing a central role in the way that colonial European settlement affects 
development today. 
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1 Introduction 
Countries have followed remarkably divergent paths of economic development since 
European colonization.  Some former colonies, such as the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malawi, and Tanzania, have experienced little economic development over the last few 
centuries, with real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of less than $2 per day.  Other 
former colonies are among the richest countries in the world today, including Australia, Canada, 
and the United States, all of which enjoy real per capita GDP levels of greater than $20,000 per 
annum. Most former colonies fall along the spectrum between these extremes. 
In seeking to explain these divergent paths, influential researchers emphasize that the 
European share of the population during the early stages of colonization shaped national rates of 
economic growth through several mechanisms. First, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) (ES) and 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) (AJR) stress that European colonization had enduring 
effects on political institutions and hence on economic development. They argue that when 
Europeans encountered national resources with lucrative international markets and did not find 
the lands, climate, and disease environment suitable for large-scale settlement, only a few 
Europeans tended to settle, and they would create authoritarian political institutions to extract 
and exploit natural resources. The institutions created by Europeans in these “extractive 
colonies” were ultimately harmful to long-run economic development. But, when Europeans 
found lands, climate, and disease environments that were suitable for smaller-scale agriculture, 
they tended to settle, forming “settler colonies.” In such colonies, Europeans formed institutions 
more protective of political and economic rights that fostered long-run economic development. 
From this perspective, a large proportion of Europeans during colonization is a precursor to 
successful economic development.  
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Glaesser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) (GLLS) emphasize a second 
mechanism, arguing that the European share of the population during colonization influenced the 
rate of human capital accumulation and hence comparative economic development. They argue 
that Europeans brought human capital and human capital creating institutions, which are 
essential for economic growth.  Since human capital disseminates slowly over generations, more 
Europeans during the early stages of colonization expedited human capital accumulation across 
the entire population, not just among those of European descent. Thus, the proportion of 
Europeans during colonization will be positively related to human capital development and 
hence overall economic development today. Moreover and critically, this view predicts that the 
proportion of Europeans during colonization will matter more for current economic development 
than the proportion of the population of European descent today because of the slow 
dissemination of human capital.  
Other researchers, either explicitly or implicitly, highlight the colonial origins of 
comparative economic development. North (1990) argues that the British brought comparatively 
strong political and legal institutions that were more conducive to economic development than 
the institutions brought by other European nations. This view stresses the need for a sufficiently 
strong European presence to instill those institutions, but does not necessarily suggest that the 
proportion of Europeans during colonization will affect economic development today beyond 
some initial threshold level. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) stress that the degree to which the 
genetic heritage of a colonial population was similar to that of the economies at the technological 
frontier positively affected the diffusion of technology and thus economic development, where 
European migration materially affected the genetic composition of economies. Putterman and 
Weil (2010) emphasize that the experience with statehood and agriculture of the ancestors of 
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people currently living within countries help explain cross-country differences in economic 
success. And, Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2011) likewise find that the ancient technologies of 
the ancestors of populations today help predict per capita income of those populations. In both of 
these papers, the ancestral nature of a population helps account for cross-country differences in 
economic development, where European colonization materially shaped the composition of 
national populations. Other papers address the role of Europeans in shaping social capital, civic 
capital, or democratic capital (Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales, 2010, Persson, 
Torsten and Guido Tabellini 2010.) Although these researchers stress alternative mechanisms 
through which European colonization shaped comparative economic development, they all 
emphasize that the nature of European settlements had long run consequences. Although we do 
not examine the specific mechanisms underlying each theory, we do assess the broad, common 
question: What was the impact of European settlement during the colonial period on economic 
development today? 
The purposes of this paper are (1) to construct a new database on the European share of 
the population during the early stages of colonization and (2) to examine its impact on the level 
of economic development today. While a considerable body of research emphasizes the role of 
European colonization on subsequent rates of economic development, what has been missing in 
the empirical literature is the key intermediating variable: colonial European settlement. We 
believe that we are the first to explicitly measure the European share of the population during 
colonization for a broad cross-section of countries and assess its impact on long-run economic 
growth.  
To identify the impact of the European share of the population during colonization on 
economic development today, we compile data on the historical determinants of European 
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settlement to use as instrumental variables. We employ a very simple model of the cost and 
benefits of European settlement to select possible instruments. Some determinants have already 
been discussed in the literature, such as (1) pre-colonial population density, (2) latitude, and (3) 
the disease environment facing Europeans. Pre-colonial population density raises the costs to 
Europeans of obtaining and securing land for new settlers. Latitude raises the benefits of simply 
transferring European technologies (such as for agriculture) to the newly settled areas.  A harsh 
disease environment facing Europeans obviously raises the expected costs of settlement.  
To this list of common determinants of European settlement, we add one very important 
new variable: indigenous mortality from European diseases. Indigenous mortality from European 
diseases is a tragic natural experiment that is a very good predictor of European settlement, since 
it removed or weakened indigenous resistance to Europeans invading new lands, and made 
plenty of fertile land available to settlers. The phenomenon is limited to lands that had essentially 
zero contact with Eurasia for thousands of years, since even a small amount of previous contact 
was enough to share diseases and develop some resistance to them. For example, trans-Sahara 
and trans-Indian Ocean contacts were enough to make Africa part of the Eurasian disease pool 
(McNeil 1976, Karlen 1995, Oldstone 1998). Historical studies and population figures show that 
only the New World (the Americas and Caribbean) and Oceania (including Australia and New 
Zealand) suffered large-scale indigenous mortality due to a lack of resistance to European 
diseases (McEvedy and Jones 1978). Thus, we use measures of the historical determinants of 
European settlement, such as pre-colonial population density and indigenous mortality, to 
identify the impact of colonial European settlement on economic development today. 
We find that the European share of the population during colonization helps explain 
economic development today, with effects of surprisingly large magnitudes. The proportion of 
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colonial Europeans is strongly and positively associated with current levels of economic 
development after accounting for (i) British legal heritage, (ii) the percentage of years the 
country has been independent since 1776, (iii) the ethnic diversity of the current population, and 
(iv) current institutions. Moreover, all of these results hold when using instrumental variables for 
the proportion of Europeans during colonization. The relationship between economic 
development today and the proportion of Europeans during colonization does weaken when 
controlling for a measure of current human capital, which is consistent with the view that human 
capital was a key intermediating channel through which colonial settlement shaped current levels 
of economic development. 
Another important result is that the European share of the population during the early 
stages of colonization is more strongly associated with economic development today than the 
percentage of the population today that is of European descent. Europeans during the 
colonization era seem to matter more for economic development today than Europeans today. 
This finding is consistent with the view that Europeans brought growth-promoting 
characteristics—such as institutions, human capital, connections with international markets, and 
cultural norms—that diffused to the rest of the population over generations. This result de-
emphasizes the importance of Europeans per se and instead emphasizes the impact of what 
Europeans brought to economies during colonization. 
Perhaps the most novel result is that the positive marginal impact of the European share 
of the population during colonization on economic development today becomes larger—not 
smaller or negative—when examining only former colonies with very few European settlers. ES 
and AJR stress that a small proportion of Europeans during colonization harmed development by 
establishing extractive institutions, but a large settlement of Europeans spurred economic 
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development by creating egalitarian institutions. Thus, creating a small European settlement in a 
region with no Europeans could actually curtail economic development by encouraging the 
establishment of extractive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). To assess these views, 
we examine only economies with a small proportion of Europeans during the colonial period, 
which we define as economies with less than 15 percent Europeans, including those that had 
essentially zero Europeans.  Even among these countries, more Europeans during colonization 
are associated with greater economic development today; indeed, the estimated coefficient on the 
European share of the colonial population increases in size in this subsample of countries. Thus, 
the positive relationship between Europeans and economic development today is not just about 
the difference between settler and extractive colonies. We do not confirm the prediction that 
colonies with essentially no Europeans performed better than (or even as well as) those colonies 
with a small group of Europeans.  
Ample qualifications temper our conclusions. First, we do not identify a single 
mechanism through which the European share of the population during colonization shaped 
long-run economic development. We show that European share is strongly associated with 
human capital and democratic political institutions today, but we do not trace the impact of 
Europeans on human capital and political institutions over time, nor do we exclude other 
potential mechanisms through which the European share of the population during colonization 
might influence economic development.  
Second, we do not assess the welfare implications of European settlement during 
colonization; we only assess the income effect under conditions where welfare and income are 
clearly not identical. Europeans often cruelly oppressed indigenous populations, as well as the 
people that they brought as slaves (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2012 for compelling examples). 
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Thus, GDP per capita today cannot measure the welfare effects of European settlement; it can 
only measure economic activity within a particular geographical area. Although there is no 
question about European oppression, the effect of European colonization on long-run economic 
development remains an open question. In this paper, we examine the relationship between 
European settlement during the colonial period and economic development today to help inform 
debates about the sources of the divergent paths of economic development taken by countries 
around the world since the colonial period. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 defines and discusses the 
data, while Section 2 provides preliminary evidence on the determinants of human settlement 
prior to European colonization and the factors shaping European settlement.  Section 3 presents 
the paper’s core results on the effect of colonial European share, considering the controls 
mentioned above. Section 4 reports an exercise in development accounting to calculate what 
share of global development can be attributed to Europeans. Section 5 concludes.   
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1. Data 
To assess the independent impact of the European share of the population during the 
early stages of colonization on the level of economic development today, we need data on (1) the 
European share of the population during colonization, (2) instrumental variables for the 
European share of the population to mitigate potential biases associated with measurement error 
and reverse causality, (3) other exogenous determinants of economic development, so that we 
can isolate the independent association between the European share of the population during 
colonization and economic development, and (4) measures of economic development today.  
This section describes only the two data series that we construct: (1) the European share 
of the population during colonization and (2) the degree to which a region experienced large 
scale indigenous mortality due to the diseases brought by European explorers in the 15th and 16th 
centuries. Since the other data that we employ in our analyses are taken from readily available 
sources, we define those variables when we present the analyses below. 
 
1.1 Euro share  
We compile data on the European share of the population during the early stages of 
colonization (Euro share) from several sources. Since colonial administrators were concerned 
about documenting the size and composition of colonial populations, there are abundant—albeit 
disparate—sources of data. Of course, there was hardly anything like a modern statistical service 
in colonial times, so that different administrators across different colonies in different time 
periods used different and often undocumented methods for assembling population statistics. 
Thus, we use a large variety of primary and secondary sources on colonial history to piece 
together data on the European share of the population. 
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Although the Data Appendix provides detailed information on our sources, the years for 
which we compiled data on each country, and discussions about the quality of the data, it is 
worth emphasizing a few points here. First, we face the tricky issue of choosing a date to 
measure European share.  We would like a date as early as possible after initial European contact 
to use European settlement as an initial condition affecting subsequent developments. At the 
same time, we do not want to pick a date that is too early after European contact since it is only 
after some process of conquest, disease control, and building of a rudimentary colonial 
infrastructure that it became possible to speak of a European settlement. Given these 
considerations, we try to choose a date at least a century after initial European contact, but at 
least 50 years before independence, which means that for conceptual reasons we do not seek to 
use a uniform date across all colonies.  Given these broad objectives for choosing a date, we 
must nevertheless select dates under severe data limitations. In particular, we do not have a 
continuous time series for each country; rather, the data reflect dates when colonial 
administrators in particular locals happened to measure or estimate populations. The Data 
Appendix provides the precise dates for each country and notes that the results are robust to 
using other methods for selecting a particular date for the European share of the population 
during colonization. 
Second, we adopt a “dog did not bark” strategy for recording zero European settlement. If 
we find no historical sources documenting any European settlement in a particular colony, we 
assume that there were no such settlers. This procedure runs the risk of biasing downward 
European settlement. However, we believe colonial histories (which are virtually all written by 
European historians) are extremely unlikely to fail to mention significant European settlements. 
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We checked and confirmed the validity of this procedure using the Acemoglu et al. (2001) data 
appendix, which gives the share of Europeans in the population in 1900.  
 
1.2 Indigenous mortality 
As instruments for European share of the population during the colonial period, we use 
several predetermined factors—including the degree to which Europeans brought diseases that 
wiped out the indigenous population. Others have carefully documented this tragic experience, 
but we believe that we are the first to use it to explain the nature of colonization and its effect on 
subsequent economic development.  
Although Europeans established at least a minimal level of contact with virtually all 
populations in the world during the colonial period, this contact had truly devastating effects on 
indigenous populations in some regions of the world but not in others. Some regions had been 
completely isolated from Eurasia for thousands of years, and thus had no previous exposure or 
resistance to Eurasian diseases. When Europeans then made contact with these populations—
which typically occurred during the initial stages of global European exploration and hence long 
before anything resembling “European settlements,” European diseases such as smallpox and 
measles spread quickly through the indigenous population, decimating the indigenous people. 
For example, when the Pilgrims arrived in New England in 1620, they found the indigenous 
population already very sparse because European fisherman had occasionally landed along the 
coast of New England in the previous decades. Similarly, De Soto’s expedition through the 
American South in 1542 spread smallpox and wiped out large numbers of indigenous people 
long before British settlers arrived.  
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Thus, we construct a dummy variable, Indigenous mortality, which equals one when a 
region experienced large-scale indigenous mortality due to the spread of European diseases 
during the initial stages of European exploration. To identify where Europeans brought diseases 
that caused widespread fatalities, we use the population data of McEvedy and Jones (1978) and 
three epidemiological world histories (McNeil 1976, Karlen 1995, Oldstone 1998). Diseases had 
circulated enough across Eurasia, Africa and the sub-continent, so that indigenous mortality did 
not shoot up with increased exposure to European explorers, traders, and slavers during the early 
stages of European colonization. The New World (Americas and Caribbean) and Oceania (the 
Pacific Islands, Australia, and New Zealand) were different. When European explorers and 
traders arrived, the microbes that they brought triggered extremely high mortality rates, which 
accords with their previous isolation from European diseases. The evidence suggests that 
mortality rates of 90 percent of the indigenous population after European contact were not 
unusual. Although we originally thought in terms of a country-by-country variable for large-
scale indigenous mortality, our review of the evidence indicates little measurable variation 
within the New World and Oceania. Consequently, Indigenous mortality is a simple dummy for 
countries in the New World and Oceania.  
The Indigenous mortality indicator has characteristics that make it a good instrument for 
Euro share. History suggests that the key determinant of the indigenous mortality effects of 
European’s making contact with other populations during the colonization period is the region’s 
previous degree of isolation from Europe, not the extent of subsequent European settlement. 
Hence, we do not believe that there is reverse causality running from European settlement to 
Indigenous mortality.  
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2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Where Did People Settle? 
European settlers confronted a non-European world of very uneven population density. 
The pre-existing density had at least two material— but opposing—effects on European 
settlement. First, indigenous population density probably reflected the attractiveness of the land 
for human settlement, including Europeans. Second, indigenous population density probably 
reflected the potential for the indigenous people to resist European settlers.  We will use the set 
of variables described below to separate these two effects on European settlement during the 
colonial period in the next section. 
Table 1a examines the determinants of population density in 1500, drawing on a rich and 
multidisciplinary literature.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of population density in 
1500, which we call Population density 1500 and is taken from Acemoglu et al (2002).  
We examine five potential determinants of population density in 1500. First, 
Biogeography is an index of the prehistoric (about 12,000 years ago) availability of storable 
crops and domesticable animals, where large values signify more mammalian herbivores and 
omnivores weighing greater than 45 kilograms and more storable annual or perennial wilds 
grasses, which are the ancestors of staple cereals (e.g., wheat, rice, corn, and barley).1 We expect 
that Biogeography is positively associated with Population density 1500. Second, Latitude 
measures the absolute value of the distance of the colony from the equator. Third, Malaria 
ecology is an ecologically-based spatial index of the stability of malaria transmission in a region, 
where larger valued signify a greater propensity for malaria transmission. The index is based on 
                                                 
1 Taken from Hibbs and Olsson (2004), Biogeography equals the first principal component of (a) the number of 
annual perennial wild grasses known to exist in the region in prehistoric times with mean kernel weight of greater 
than ten milligrams and (b) the number of domesticable large mammals known to exist in the region in prehistoric 
times with a mean weight of more than 45 kilos. 
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jointly assessing the impact of climate and the proportion of land area infected with malaria.2 We 
do not have strong priors on the relationship between population density in 1500 and either 
Latitude or Malaria ecology. While Latitude or Malaria ecology might influence the suitability 
of a region to European settlement, it is not clear that they will shape population density before 
European colonization. Fourth, Indigenous mortality is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
region experienced a large drop in the indigenous population from diseases brought by 
Europeans. As defined above, we constructed this variable from historical sources. Fifth, Settler 
mortality equals historical deaths per annum per 1,000 European settlers (generally soldiers, or 
bishops in Latin America) and is taken from AJR’s (2001) highly influential study of 
comparative economic development. Though Albouy (forthcoming) has challenged the validity 
of this indicator, we use Settler mortality to assess the association between European mortality 
after colonization and population density prior to their arrival. Since Settler mortality occurs after 
1500, we do not expect this to exert an independent, causal effect on population density in 1500. 
We find that population density in 1500 was greater in environments that were more 
conducive to the domestication of animals and the cultivation of storable plants as measured by 
Biogeography, confirming the findings in Diamond (1997). These results are robust to including 
the other explanatory variables. Thus, unsurprisingly, human settlement was denser in areas 
where it was easier to produce food. 
Several other characteristics do not have a robust, independent link with population 
density in 1500. Features such as the Malaria ecology and Latitude are not associated with pre-
Columbian population density in 1500. And, Settler mortality is not significantly correlated with 
population density in 1500 after controlling for other characteristics of the country. This is 
                                                 
2 The Malaria ecology index is from Kiszewski et al (2004) and captures of the stability of malaria transmission based 
biological characteristics of mosquitoes such the proportion of blood meals taken from human hosts, daily survival of the 
mosquito, and duration of the transmission season and of extrinsic incubation. 
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consistent with the view that although characteristics like the prevalence of malaria, distance 
from the equator, and the extent of European mortality might have shaped European settlement 
during colonization, these characteristics did not affect the population density of former colonies 
before Europeans arrived. 
It is curious that Indigenous mortality, which occurred after colonization, is negatively 
associated with population density in 1500. This finding indicates that areas that were isolated 
from Europeans prior to colonization and hence more susceptible to European-borne diseases 
had lower population density in 1500 AD. This may be related to Spolaore and Wacziarg’s 
(2009) result on diffusion of technology as a function of when different branches of humanity 
became separated. Populations in Oceania and the Western Hemisphere had been isolated from 
the rest for a very long time, and hence they did not get either (1) the more advanced technology 
originating in the Old World that would have helped support a larger population or (2) the 
exposure to European diseases before colonization that would have them more resistant to 
European diseases and hence to European settlement. We will see that this combination of low 
density and vulnerability to European diseases plays a large role in accounting for where 
Europeans settled. 
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2.2 Where Did Europeans Settle? 
We now turn from the question of what shaped the settlement of humans before 1500 to 
the question of what shaped the settlement of Europeans during the early stages of colonization. 
Table 1b provides regression results concerning which factors shaped European settlement 
during colonization, where the dependent variable is the proportion of Europeans in the colonial 
population (Euro share).  
The regressors in Table 1b are as follows. First, we include Population density 1500. 
Since the regressions also include other variables to control for the attractiveness of the land for 
settlement, we examine the relationship between Euro share and population density in 1500 
conditional on the generalized attractiveness of the land for human settlement. A plausible 
interpretation of the conditional impact of Population density 1500 on Euro share is that it 
gauges the ability of the indigenous population to resist European settlement. Second, Indigenous 
mortality provides additional information on the inability of the indigenous population to resist 
European settlers. If European diseases eliminate much of the indigenous population, this would 
clearly reduce their ability to oppose European settlement. Third, Latitude might have special 
relevance for European settlers, who might be especially attracted to lands with the same 
temperate climate as in Europe. Fourth, Precious Metals is an indicator of whether the region has 
valuable minerals since this might have affected European settlement. Fifth, one cost of settling 
in a particular country might be its distance from Europe, so we use the distance from London as 
a gauge (London). Finally, we examine other possible determinants of the attractiveness of the 
land for settlement from Table 1a, including Biogeography, Maria ecology, and Settler 
Mortality.  
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The results show that three factors account for the bulk of cross-country variation in 
European settlement during the colonial period. First, the density of the indigenous population 
matters.  In regions with a high concentration of non-Europeans who had already occupied the 
land and could supply forces of resistance, Europeans comprised a much smaller fraction of the 
colonial population than in other lands.  Second, indigenous mortality matters. Where the 
indigenous population fell drastically because of European diseases, European settlers were more 
likely to settle. Third, many of the regressions also suggest positive relationship between Euro 
share and Latitude, even when conditioning on Population density 1500 and Indigenous 
mortality. In general, Europeans were a larger proportion of the colonial population in higher 
(temperate) latitudes, plausibly because of the similarity with the climate conditions to their 
home region. However, Latitude does not enter significantly when also controlling for 
Biogeography. 
None of the other possible determinants are significant after controlling for these three 
determinants. The differences between 1a and 1b are important, because they might affect the 
plausibility of the exclusion restrictions below when we use Population density 1500 and 
Indigenous mortality as instruments for European settlement. European colonial settlement, 
unlike pre-Columbian population, was NOT driven by the intrinsic, long-run potential of the 
land—as measured especially by Biogeography.  
Three factors, Population density 1500, Indigenous mortality, and Latitude help explain 
in a simple way the big picture associated with European settlements, or the lack thereof, in 
regions around the world. Where all three factors were favorable for European settlement, such 
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, the European share of the colonial 
population was very high. When only some of the three factors were favorable, there tended to 
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be a minority share of European settlers. Latin America suffered large-scale indigenous 
mortality, but only some regions were temperate, and most regions had relatively high pre-
Columbian population density (which is why more people of indigenous origin survived in Latin 
America compared to North America, even though both regions experience high indigenous 
mortality rates when exposed to European diseases).  Southern Africa was temperate and had 
low population density, but did not experience large-scale indigenous mortality. These factors 
can also explain where Europeans did not settle. The rest of sub-Saharan Africa was tropical and 
again did not experience much indigenous mortality from exposure to the microbes brought by 
Europeans during colonization. And, most of Asia had high population density, did not suffer 
much indigenous mortality from European borne diseases, and is in or near the tropics, all of 
which combine to explain the low values of Euro share across much of Asia. 
One of the most famous variables in the literature on explaining European settlement is 
the Settler mortality measure calculated by AJR. Our collection of actual data on colonial 
settlement allows this explanatory value to be tested for the first time. This variable does have a 
significant simple correlation with European settlement, confirming the prediction in AJR. But, 
when entered with the three variables that we found most robust in other specifications, the 
settler mortality variable becomes insignificant and does not materially alter the statistical 
significance of the other variables (though it does reduce the magnitude of their estimate 
coefficients). Apparently, Settler mortality does not exert an independent effect on Euro share, 
but Indigenous mortality does.  
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3 Results: Do Europeans Matter? 
3.1 Do Europeans Matter? Introductory thoughts 
We begin by assessing the relationship between Euro share and the current level of 
economic development as measured by the average of the log of real per capita GDP over the 
decade from 1995 to 2005 (Current income). Using data averaged over a decade reduces the 
influences of business cycle fluctuations on our measure of current economic development. We 
condition on a range of national characteristics to assess the independent relationship between 
Current income and Euro share. Controlling for an array of other potential determinants of 
economic development also provides some suggestive evidence on the channels linking Euro 
share and Current income.   
We consider the following cross-country regression: 
Current income = α*Euro share + β′X + u,                                                                        (1) 
where X is a matrix of national characteristics that we define below, and u is an error term, 
potentially reflecting economic growth factors that are idiosyncratic to particular countries, as 
well as omitted variables, and mis-specification of the functional form.  Different theories 
provide distinct predictions about (a) the coefficient on Euro share (α), (b) whether α changes 
when conditioning on particular national characteristics, and (c) how α changes across sub-
samples of countries.  
We get some insight into the channels connecting Euro share and Current income by 
examining how α changes when controlling for the different potential channels discussed above: 
political institutions and human capital. Thus, if Euro share is related to current levels of 
economic development through its effect on the formation of enduring political institutions, then 
Euro share will not enjoy an independent relationship with economic development today when 
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controlling for political institutions. And, if Euro share is related to economic development 
today through its effect on the spread of human capital, then Euro share will not enter 
significantly when controlling for educational attainment today. We examine these issues below. 
 
3.2 Do Europeans Matter?  OLS Results 
We begin by evaluating equation (1) while conditioning on an array of national 
characteristics (X). Legal origin is dummy variable that equals one if the country has a common 
law (British) legal tradition.  This dummy variable both captures the argument by North (1990) 
that the United Kingdom instilled better growth-promoting institutions than other European 
powers and the view advanced by La Porta et al (2008) that the British legal tradition was more 
conducive to the development of growth-enhancing financial systems than other legal origins, 
such as the Napoleonic Code passed on by French and other European colonizers. Education 
equals the average gross rate of secondary school enrollment from 1995 to 2005 and is taken 
from the World Development Indicators. Independence equals the fraction of years since 1776 
that a country has been independent. As in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) and 
Easterly and Levine (2003), we use this to measure the degree to which a country has had the 
time to develop its own economic institutions. Government quality is an index of current level of 
government accountability and effectiveness and is taken from Kaufman et at (2002). Ethnicity is 
from Easterly and Levine (1997) and measures each country’s degree of ethnic diversity. In 
particular, it measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are 
from different ethnolinguistic groups. Finally, as defined above, Settler mortality measures the 
degree to which European mortality during the colonial period. Since the purpose of our research 
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is to examine the impact of European settlement outside of Europe, all of the regressions exclude 
European countries. 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS), Table 2a shows that there is—with a few notable 
exceptions—a positive, significant relation between Current income and Euro share.  For 
example, regression (1) indicates that an increase in Euro share of 0.1 (where the mean value of 
Euro share is 0.07 and the standard deviation is 0.07) is associated with an increase in Current 
income of 0.36 (where the mean value of Current income is 8.2 and the standard deviation is 
1.3). The strong positive link between the European share of the population during colonization 
and current economic development holds when conditioning on different national characteristics, 
with two key exceptions. The coefficient on Euro share falls drastically and becomes 
insignificant when conditioning on either Government quality or Education.  These findings are 
consistent with—though by no means a definitive demonstration of—the views that the share of 
Europeans in the population during colonization shaped long-run economic development by 
affecting political institutions and human capital accumulation. 
These results could be driven by a few former colonies in which Europeans were a large 
fraction of the population during the early stages of economic development and that just happen 
to be well-developed former colonies today. Thus, we conduct the analyses for a sample of 
countries in which Euro share was less than 15 percent.3  The goal of restricting the sample to 
only those countries where Europeans account for a small proportion of the population is to 
assess whether the relation between Euro share and Current income holds when there is only a 
small minority of Europeans.  While there is no formal definition of what constitutes a “minority 
                                                 
3 We also considering entering Euro Share in a quadratic function, in a spline regression, or in some other nonlinear 
function. However, these functional forms do not lend themselves to the IV techniques we will use in the next 
section, so we chose instead to stick with the procedure of a restricted sample in which Euro Share was less than .15. 
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European colony,” we use less than 15 percent European as a conservative benchmark of a non-
settler colony.  
As shown in Table 2b, however, the coefficient on Euro share actually becomes larger 
when restricting the sample to those countries in which Euro share is less than 15 percent. The 
increase in the coefficient on Euro share when restricting the sample to former colonies with 
small values of Euro share suggests that the relationship between the European share of the 
population during colonization and the level of economic development does not simply represent 
the economic success of “settler colonies.” Rather, a marginal increase in Euro share has a 
bigger effect on subsequent economic development in colonies with only a few Europeans—
there seems to be diminishing marginal long-run development product to Euro share. A marginal 
increase in Euro share is associated with an especially large boost to long-run economic growth 
in former colonies with only a small share of Europeans.  
The relationship between Current income and Euro share is sensitive to controlling for 
political institutions and especially to controlling for human capital accumulation. As shown in 
Table 2b, the size of the economic association between Current income and Euro share shrinks 
and becomes insignificant when conditioning on educational attainment (regression 3), and the 
association between Current income and Euro share shrinks though remains significant at the 10 
percent level when conditioning on political institutions (regression 5).  
The coefficient on British legal origin is never significant (nor will it be in the rest of the 
paper). It is also of interest that many of the colonies with Euro Share < .15 were Spanish 
colonies. Hence we find no evidence for the popular view that British colonization or legal origin 
led to more development than Spanish colonization or legal origin. 
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3.3 Do Europeans Matter? 2SLS 
To control for potential simultaneity bias, we seek to employ instrumental variables that 
are correlated with the proportion of Europeans during colonization but that are unlikely to 
explain current levels of economic development beyond their effect on Euro share. Based on the 
evidence presented in Table 1b concerning the determinants of Euro share, we use Population 
density 1500 and Indigenous mortality as instruments for Euro Share. Although Latitude also 
helps explain Euro share in Table 1b, it is more difficult to argue that Latitude only influences 
economic development today through its effect on Euro share. Latitude might also have affected 
the ability of Europeans to transfer technologies from Europe to other parts of the globe, with 
long-term ramifications on economic development beyond its effects on Euro share. Latitude is 
indeed one of the most common instruments in the entire cross-country literature, suggestive of 
many other postulated channels by which it affects development. Thus, we do not include 
Latitude as an instrument.4  
Standard specification tests support the validity of the instruments. First, the first-stage 
regression, which is presented in column 1 of Table 1b, is powerful. It has a high F-statistic that 
makes weak instruments unlikely to be a problem. Furthermore, we show that the instruments 
reject the Kleibergen Paap (2006) LM test of weak instruments in Tables 3a and 3b. Second, we 
use a standard over-identification (OIR) test of whether the instruments—Population density 
1500 and Indigenous mortality—explain Current income beyond their effect on Euro share.  As 
shown in Tables 3a and 3b, the instrumental variables do not reject the OIR test that the 
instruments are valid. Although we are aware that exclusion restrictions in macro regressions are 
seldom completely credible, and that OIR tests suffer from low power, the OIR test is not 
                                                 
4 When including Latitude as an instrument, the coefficient estimate on Euro share changes little, but the OIR-test is 
sometimes rejected, suggesting that indeed Latitude explains economic development today beyond its ability to 
account for cross-country differences in the European share of the population during colonization. 
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rejected and there are sound conceptual reasons for using Population density 1500 and 
Indigenous mortality as excluded instruments.  
The impact of Euro share on Current income is economically large, especially when 
restricting the analyses to former colonies in which Europeans were a small minority of the 
population (less than 15%) during the early stages of colonization. For example, again consider 
an increase in Euro share of 0.10.  The estimated coefficient on Euro share in regression 1 of 
Table 3b (21) indicates that an increase in the proportion of Europeans during colonization of ten 
percentage points will translate into an increase in real per capita income today of 2.1.  This is 
large. For example, consider just a one percentage point increase in Euro share in the case of 
Brazil. The estimated coefficients suggest that if Brazil had a Euro share of 0.084 rather than 
0.074, then its average GDP per capita over the period from 1995 to 2005 would have been 
$9,798 instead of $7,942. 
The instrumental variable results again emphasize a key, and surprising, finding: far from 
being attenuated, the economic development effect of an additional percentage point of European 
population during the colonial period is much larger in minority European colonies than in a 
majority European colony. While an enormous body of research documents and emphasizes the 
exploitative behavior of minority white populations around the world, the regressions suggest 
that Europeans brought factors of production that boosted long-run economic development, 
especially among colonies with a only a few Europeans. As we emphasized in the introduction, 
this is not a welfare calculation—GDP per capita today does not measure the welfare effects of 
colonization. We are simply observing that contrary to some theories, and consistent with others, 
a marginal increase in European settlement in a geographic area during colonization had an 
especially positive effect on the level of economic development today within that geographic 
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region, especially in places that had only a small, minority of Europeans living in the area during 
colonization.  
The relationship between Current income and Euro share weakens appreciably when 
conditioning on Education and weakens slightly when controlling for Government quality, 
especially when focusing on the sample of countries with less than 15 percent Euro share.  In 
Table 3b, the estimated coefficient on the exogenous component of Euro share drops by about 
two-thirds and become significant at only the 10 percent level when controlling for Education, 
suggesting that the relation between Euro share and Current income is not independent of its 
association with Education. The relationship between Current income and Euro share also 
changes when conditioning on Government quality. In Table 3b, controlling for Government 
quality reduces the size of the estimated coefficient on Euro share by about one-third, although it 
remains significant at the one percent level. 
This is suggestive again that the human capital and institutional channels are important 
for the effect of colonial European settlement on development today, with stronger evidence for 
the human capital channel. Of course, we do not control for the potential endogenous 
determination of education and political institutions (an important but inescapable caveat given 
the usual inability to develop a full identification strategy covering three endogenous regressors). 
And, so we simply provide these analyses as suggestive of the potential channels, without nailing 
them down empirically—a nontrivial task left for future research. 
Overall, the IV findings are suggestive of a causal impact of colonial European settlement 
on per capita income today. We are of course aware of the many plausible criticisms of the 
internal validity of causal effects in cross-country macro regressions. The OLS results would still 
remain of considerable interest in establishing a robust correlation between European settlement 
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a long time ago and outcomes today. Along with a wide array of recent research, our results 
indicate that historical factors play an enduring role in shaping economic development. 
 
3.4 Is it Europeans during Colonization or Europeans today? 
Euro share might proxy for the proportion of the current population that is of European 
descent. Figure 1 shows there is indeed a positive association between colonial Euro share and 
European share in modern times (measured in 2000 from Putterman and Weil 2010). 
Consequently, it may be inappropriate to interpret the results on Euro share as reflecting the 
enduring impact of Europeans during the colonization period on economic development.  Rather, 
Europeans might have simply migrated to economically successful countries after colonization.   
 To assess the strength of the independent relationship between the level of economic 
development today and the European share of the population during the early stages of the 
colonial, we therefore control for the proportion of the population today that is of European 
descent (Tables 4a and 4b). We would like to use instrumental variables for both Euro share and 
the fraction of the population today that is of European descent and therefore separately identify 
the impact of each on Current income. But, we faced a weak instruments problem: we could not 
find instrumental variables that separately explained Euro share and the current European share 
of the population, while also satisfying the exclusion restriction. Since the standard errors of the 
IV regressions are not reported correctly with a weak instruments problem, we do not report 
them.  Instead, we use OLS regressions to produce suggestive partial correlations between 
Current income and Euro share while controlling for the proportion of Europeans today (Euro 
2000 P-W) and other explanatory variables. 
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We find a positive relationship between Current income and Euro share even when 
controlling for the current proportion of the population of European descent.  Euro 2000 P-W is 
usually significant, but Euro share remains significant in the same regressions as in earlier 
results. That is, the significance (of both old and current Euro share) vanishes when we control 
for the channels of human capital or institutions, but is significant in other regressions. These 
results are robust to limiting the sample to having the colonial Euro share less than .15.  
A graph helps understand whether the proportion of Europeans during the colonization 
period is more strongly associated with current economic development than the proportion of the 
population today that is of European descent. Examining the scatter plot in Figure 1, consider 
three groups of countries: (1) countries in which Euro share was high both in colonial times and 
today (e.g. North America), (2) countries in which Euro share was low both in colonial times and 
today (e.g. South Africa), and (3) countries in which Euro share today is much higher than it was 
in colonial times (e.g. some Central and South American countries). If colonial Euro share did 
not matter independently for income today, then we would expect group (3)’s income to be more 
like group (1)’s income. But, this is not what we find. In contrast, if colonial Euro share does 
matter independently for income today, then we would expect group (3)’s income to have lower 
income than group (1) and to have similar income to group (2). This is what we observe, 
illustrating the finding that the proportion of Europeans during the colonization period is 
independently associated with economic development today, and the results are not driven by the 
proportion of Europeans today.  
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4. How much development is attributable to Europeans? 
 
In this section, we do some global development accounting to illustrate how much of 
development might be associated with European settlers. This exercise uses the estimated 
equation for Euro share with no controls 
(1) iii EuroShareomeCurrentInc εβα ++=)ln(  
  
Next, define the counterfactual CurrentIncomeCF for every country outside of Europe by 
removing the European effect: 
 
(2) iEuroShareiCFi eomeCurrentIncomeCurrentInc ⋅−⋅= β  
 
Of course, CurrentIncomei=CurrentIncomeCFi for any country i where Eurosharei=0. 
  
The counterfactual population-weighted global mean is then simply the weighted mean 
across all non-European countries of CurrentIncomeCFi , where Pi is population in country i, and 
P is total global population (we have data on 139 non-European countries).  
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As an illustrative exercise, we use regression (1) of Table 3a, which is the simplest 
instrumental variable regression. It includes all countries outside of Europe. The coefficient 
estimate is β = 7.8.  
Using the 2000 population weights, the data and estimated coefficients indicate that 47% 
of the development outside of Europe is attributed to the share of European settlers during the 
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early stages of colonization 
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. We repeat our frequent caveat that global per capita 
income is not a welfare measure, especially in light of the history of European exploitation of 
non-Europeans. As an exercise in positive analysis, however, it is striking how much of global 
development is associated with Europeans (not even considering the development of Europe 
itself). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The results are consistent with the view that the proportion of Europeans during the early 
stages of colonization exerted an enduring, positive impact on economic development.  These 
findings hold when (1) restricting the sample to non-settler colonies, (2) conditioning on the 
current proportion of the population of European descent, and (3) using instrumental variables to 
extract the exogenous component of Euro share.   
These results relate to theories of the origins of the divergent paths of economic 
development followed since Europeans colonization.  Engerman and Sokoloff (ES) (1997) 
emphasize that agricultural, mineral, the size and robustness of the indigenous population, and 
other endowments encountered by Europeans affected the formation of institutions, including 
political institutions, with long-run effects on economic development.  ES emphasize that the 
degree of European settlement reflects these endowments, but Europeans per se are not a causal, 
independent explanation of the divergent paths of economic development since colonization.  In 
the findings presented above, however, the proportion of Europeans during the early colonial 
period had a lasting effect beyond endowments and political institutions—Europeans brought 
factors that fostered long-run economic development. ES also suggested a negative effect of 
minority European settlement, but we find no evidence of this. We find the positive effect of 
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Europeans during colonization on economic development today becomes larger—not smaller or 
negative—when examining only former colonies with a very few European settlers. 
Similarly, AJR stress that when endowments lead to the formation of settler colonies, this 
produced more egalitarian, enduring political institutions that fostered long-run economic 
development. We have shown nothing to contradict this view. But, it is not the full story. The 
institutional measure does not robustly win a horse race with the European share of the 
population during the early stages of colonization. Furthermore, our results are also not 
consistent with the “Northian” (1990) view that British institutions independently account for a 
large proportion of comparative economic development.  
In contrast, a measure of education today does consistently win a horse race with colonial 
European share. Although hardly definitive, the results are more consistent with the GLLS 
argument that Europeans brought human capital and human capital creating institutions and the 
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2008) emphasis on the role of human 
capital accumulation in explaining the divergence of economies in the long-run.   
The previous literature was correct to focus on colonial settlement by Europeans as one 
of the pivotal events in the history of economic development. We confirmed it in this paper by 
directly measuring this colonial European settlement for the first time and showing it to have 
dramatic effects on outcomes today. 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Euro Share 130 0.07 0.17 0 0.905 0.00 
Euro 2000 Putterman-Weil 116 0.13 0.24 0 0.9 0 
Current Income 124 8.18 1.25 5.48 11.04 8.13 
Population density 1500 95 0.50 1.52 -3.83 4.61 0.41 
Indigenous Mortality 128 0.29 0.46 0 1 0 
Latitude 130 0.20 0.12 0.01 0.67 0.18 
Malaria Ecology 115 5.20 7.29 0 31.55 1.47 
Settler Mortality 81 4.71 1.19 2.15 7.99 4.54 
Biogeography 79 -0.51 0.98 -3.37 1.71 -0.97 
Legal Origin 130 0.40 0.49 0 1 0 
Education 123 57.36 30.58 5.60 152.84 60.19 
Independence 90 0.31 0.34 0 1 0.10 
Government Quality 129 -0.51 1.96 -4.91 4.62 -0.63 
Ethnicity 116 0.38 0.32 0 1 0.34 
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Table B: Variable Definitions 
 Definition Source 
Euro Share Proportion of Europeans in colonial population 
Constructed. See Appendix for 
details. 
Euro 2000 P-W 
Proportion of Europeans in 2000 population. Constructed from Putterman and 
Weil’s (2010) migration database by (for each country in the sample) adding the 
proportion of ancestors coming from each European country. Putterman and Weil (2010) 
Current Income 
Ln average of GDP per capita over 1995-2005 (PPP, Constant 2005 International 
$) 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
Population 
density 1500 Log Population per square km in 1500 AJR (2002) 
Indigenous 
Mortality 
Dummy variable reflecting high rates of indigenous mortality from European 
diseases. 
McEvedy and Jones (1978), 
McNeil (1976), Karlen (1995), 
Oldstone (1998) 
Latitude The absolute value of latitude in degrees, divided by 90 to be between 0 and 1 CIA World Factbook 
Malaria Ecology 
An index of the stability of malaria transmission based biological characteristics of 
mosquitoes such the proportion of blood meals taken from human hosts, daily 
survival of the mosquito, and duration of the transmission season and of extrinsic 
incubation. Kiszewski et al (2004) 
Settler Mortality 
Log of  potential settler mortality, measured in terms of deaths per annum per 
1,000 "mean strength” (constant population) AJR (2001) 
Biogeography 
The first principal component of log of number of native plants species and log 
number of native animals specifics, where plants are defined as “ storable annual or 
perennial wild grasses with a mean kernel weight exceeding 10 mg (ancestors of 
domestic cereals such as wheat, rice, corn, and barley)” and animals are defined 
denotes the number of species of wild terrestrial mammalian herbivores and 
omnivores weighing >45 kg that are believed to have been domesticated 
prehistorically in various regions of the world.”  Hibbs and Olsson (2004) p2 Hibbs and Olsson (2004) 
British Legal 
Origin A dummy variable indicating British legal origin. La Porta et al (1999) 
Education Average rate of gross secondary school enrollment from 1995-2005 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
Independence The fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent Easterly and Levine (1997) 
Government 
Quality 
The first principal component of the six governance indicators from the 
2002 vintage of Kaufman et al Kaufman et al (2002) 
Ethnicity An index of ethnic diversity (updated). Easterly and Levine (1997) 
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Table 1a: Human Settlement before European Colonization 
The sample is non-European countries. The dependent variable the log of population density in 1500.  Biogeography is an index of domesticable 
animals and plants existing prior to colonization. Indigenous mortality is a dummy variable which is positive if a substantial number of natives 
died due to initial contact with Europeans. Maria ecology is an ecologically-based spatial index of the stability of malaria transmission. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coefficients 
on all the explanatory variables equal zero. P values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level 
respectively. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Population 
density 
1500 
Population 
density 
1500 
Population 
density 
1500 
Population 
density 
1500 
Population 
density 
1500 
Biogeography 0.609**    0.696** 
 (0.0152)    (0.0482) 
Latitude  -3.084   -3.103 
  (0.101)   (0.170) 
Malaria ecology   0.0275  0.00749 
   (0.105)  (0.746) 
Indigenous mortality     -1.361*** -0.603 
    (8.64e-06) (0.136) 
      
Observations 69 96 90 96 69 
R-squared 0.110 0.053 0.017 0.182 0.207 
Prob>F 0.0152 0.101 0.105 8.64e-06 0.0360 
F test: 6.211 2.750 2.681 22.16 2.743 
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Table 1b: What Determined the Degree of European Settlement?  
The sample is non-European countries. The dependent variable Euro share is the proportion of Europeans in the colonial 
population. Population density 1500 is the log of population density in 1500. Indigenous mortality is a dummy variable 
which is positive if a substantial proportion of natives died due to initial contact with Europeans. Latitude is the absolute 
value of distance from the equator. P values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 
10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) (7) 
 Euro share Euro share Euro share Euro share Euro 
share 
Euro share Euro share 
Population density 1500 -0.0357** -0.0275*** -0.0277*** -0.0269** -0.00376 -0.0272*** -0.0324** 
 (0.0249) (0.00744) (0.00706) (0.0129) (0.152) (0.00774) (0.0140) 
Indigenous mortality 0.156*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.0737*** 0.144*** 0.0865** 
 (1.04e-05) (9.54e-06) (1.58e-05) (2.94e-05) (5.80e-05) (0.000413) (0.0332) 
Latitude  0.661*** 0.664*** 0.686*** 0.0780 0.680*** 0.674*** 
  (9.36e-05) (9.59e-05) (7.18e-05) (0.102) (0.000132) (0.000195) 
Precious metals   -0.00370      
   (0.897)      
London    6.58e-08     
    (0.993)     
Biogeography     -0.000861    
     (0.828)    
Malaria ecology      0.000988   
      (0.405)   
Settler Mortality       -0.0150 
       (0.195) 
         
Observations 95 95 95 91 68 89 73 
R-squared 0.375 0.544 0.544 0.547 0.486 0.541 0.582 
Prob>F 1.32e-05 5.59e-07 2.17e-06 2.28e-06 3.51e-06 1.12e-05 8.19e-06 
F test: 12.73 12.64 9.392 9.430 9.709 8.277 8.850 
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Table 2a: Does the degree of European settlement explain per capita income today?  
The sample is non-European countries. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005 Euro share is proportion of 
Europeans in the colonial population. Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country’s laws are based on the United Kingdom’s 
legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. Independence is the fraction of years 
since 1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government accountability and 
effectiveness. Ethnicity is a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity. All specifications are estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coefficients on all the explanatory variables equal zero. P values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in 
the appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Euro share 3.622*** 3.625*** 0.617 3.339*** 0.641 3.430*** 
  (0.000) (6.30e-11) (0.230) (1.49e-09) (0.209) (0.00) 
British Legal 
origin  -0.00406     
   (0.986)     
Education   0.0308***    
   (0.000)    
Independence    0.830**   
     (0.0252)   
Government 
Quality     0.407***  
      (1.07e-09)  
Ethnicity      -1.326*** 
      (1.60e-05) 
       
Observations 124 124 120 89 124 112 
R-squared 0.166 0.166 0.636 0.302 0.433 0.372 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F test: 63.64 31.59 105.4 37.50 80.72 86.11 
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Table 2b: Does the degree of European settlement explain per capita income today?  
The sample is countries with Euro share values of less than 0.15. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005. 
Euro share is proportion of Europeans in the colonial population. Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country’s laws are 
based on the United Kingdom’s legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. 
Independence is the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current 
government accountability and effectiveness. Ethnicity is a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity. All specifications are estimated using OLS 
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coefficients on all the explanatory variables equal 
zero. P values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Detailed variable definitions 
and sources are in the appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Euro share 8.492*** 8.500*** -0.571 10.05*** 4.073* 9.605*** 
  (0.000107) (0.000111) (0.785) (0.000230) (0.0648) (3.21e-05) 
British Legal 
origin  -0.0402     
   (0.868)     
Education    0.0325***    
   (0)    
Independence    0.801*   
     (0.0543)   
Government 
Quality     0.402***  
      (1.91e-08)  
Ethnicity      -1.196*** 
      (0.000318) 
       
Observations 112 112 110 80 112 100 
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.601 0.191 0.347 0.252 
Prob>F 0.000107 0.000550 0 7.47e-07 3.53e-10 0 
F test: 16.16 8.046 100.9 17.04 26.75 41.06 
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Table 3a: Using instrumental variables, does European settlement explain per capita 
income today? 
The sample is non-European countries. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005. Euro share is proportion of 
Europeans in the colonial population. Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country’s laws are based on the United Kingdom’s 
legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002Independence is the fraction of years since 
1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government accountability and effectiveness. 
Ethnicity is a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS, with Population density 1500 and indigenous 
mortality instrumenting for Euro share, and with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The OIR p-value refers to the J statistic from the 
Hansen-Sargan test, with null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The LM p-value refers the LM Kleibergen-Paap 
(2006) rk statistic, which is a generalization to non-iid errors of the LM version of Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test, with 
null hypothesis that the first-stage regression is underidentified. P values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 
and 10% level respectively. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Euro share 7.775*** 7.882*** 3.270*** 7.739*** 6.885*** 6.959*** 
  (5.60e-06) (1.67e-06) (0.00546) (0.000136) (0.00139) (7.84e-05) 
British Legal 
origin  -0.186     
   (0.379)     
Education   0.0218***    
   (1.01e-10)    
Independence    -0.110   
     (0.820)   
Government 
Quality     0.0863  
      (0.561)  
Ethnicity      -0.700* 
      (0.0611) 
       
Observations 92 92 89 78 92 91 
OIR p-value: 0.813 0.887 0.966 0.934 0.597 0.714 
LM p-value 4.01e-05 2.67e-05 0.0237 0.0162 0.000405 0.000622 
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Table 3b: Using instrumental variables, does European settlement explain per capita 
income today? 
The sample is non-European countries with Euro Share<.15. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005. Euro 
share is proportion of Europeans in the colonial population. Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country’s laws are based on 
the United Kingdom’s legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. Independence is 
the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government 
accountability and effectiveness. Ethnicity is a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity. All specifications are estimated using 2SLS, with 
Population density 1500 and indigenous mortality instrumenting for Euro share, and with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The OIR p-
value refers to the J statistic from the Hansen-Sargan test, with null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The LM p-
value refers the LM Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic, which is a generalization to non-iid errors of the LM version of Anderson canonical 
correlations likelihood-ratio test, with null hypothesis that the first-stage regression is underidentified. P values are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Current 
income 
Euro share 21.14*** 21.24*** 6.812* 25.56*** 14.95*** 18.75*** 
  (0) (0) (0.0751) (1.46e-06) (1.19e-06) (5.16e-06) 
British Legal 
origin  0.114     
   (0.632)     
Education   0.0251***    
   (9.85e-11)    
Independence    -0.288   
     (0.515)   
Government 
Quality     0.306***  
      (0.000537)  
Ethnicity      -0.521 
      (0.164) 
       
Observations 81 81 79 69 81 80 
OIR p-value: 0.295 0.274 0.238 0.252 0.930 0.174 
LM p-value 2.10e-05 1.95e-05 0.00374 0.00652 4.55e-05 4.07e-05 
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Table 4a: Which has more of an effect on per capita income today, colonial or recent 
European settlement? 
The sample is non-European countries Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005. Euro share is proportion of 
Europeans in the colonial population. Euro 2000 P-W is the proportion of Europeans in the 2000 population (using Putterman and Weil’s (2010) 
migration database). Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country’s laws are based on the United Kingdom’s legal system. 
Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. Independence is the fraction of years since 1776 that a 
country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government accountability and effectiveness. Ethnicity is 
a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity. All regressions are OLS; P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 
1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Euro Share 1.907*** 1.688*** 0.419 2.105*** -0.232 2.107*** 
 (2.31e-06) (0.00376) (0.473) (5.58e-05) (0.706) (3.30e-08) 
Euro 2000 P-W 1.352*** 1.465*** 0.152 1.054 0.890** 1.106*** 
 (0.000198) (0.000378) (0.682) (0.116) (0.0192) (0.00547) 
British Legal 
Origin  0.124     
  (0.634)     
Education   0.0315***    
   (0)    
Independence    0.628   
    (0.228)   
Government 
Quality     0.379***  
     (1.68e-07)  
Ethnicity      -1.104*** 
      (0.00141) 
       
Observations 113 113 111 86 113 103 
R-squared 0.187 0.189 0.637 0.320 0.418 0.371 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F test: 69.52 47.48 61.98 53.00 52.77 99.03 
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Table 4b:Which has more of an effect on per capita income today, colonial or recent 
European settlement? 
The sample is non-European countries with Euro Share<.15. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005.  Euro 
share is proportion of Europeans in the colonial population Euro 2000 P-W is the proportion of Europeans in the 2000 population (using 
Putterman and Weil’s (2010) migration database).  Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country’s laws are based on the 
United Kingdom’s legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. Independence is the 
fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government 
accountability and effectiveness. Ethnicity is a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity. All regressions are OLS. P values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the 
appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Current 
Income 
Euro Share 6.246** 5.895** -1.604 9.285*** 2.494 8.386*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0391) (0.522) (0.00420) (0.408) (0.00182) 
Euro 2000 P-W 0.948** 1.050** 0.317 0.193 0.728 0.592 
 (0.0272) (0.0302) (0.456) (0.824) (0.123) (0.170) 
British Legal 
Origin  0.0961     
  (0.719)     
Education   0.0331***    
   (0)    
Independence    0.778   
    (0.183)   
Government 
Quality     0.384***  
     (3.85e-07)  
Ethnicity      -1.087*** 
      (0.00172) 
       
Observations 106 106 104 79 106 96 
R-squared 0.078 0.080 0.601 0.193 0.343 0.258 
Prob>F 1.85e-05 5.74e-05 0 1.18e-06 1.04e-09 0 
F test: 12.14 8.250 64.94 12.36 18.62 27.45 
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Figure 1: Colonial European Share and European Share Today 
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Data Appendix  
 
This appendix describes the construction of the dataset on the European share of the 
population in countries around the world during the early stages of colonization. The primary 
goal is to define what we did, so that the numbers are transparent and replicable. At the end of 
the appendix, we list some of the problems that we encountered in constructing the database, and 
the difficulties that we faced in choosing which years to use in defining a country’s “European 
share of the population during the early stages of colonization.” The dataset and other key 
information are contained in the excel workbook titled “Appendix_Europeans,” which is 
available on request. In this Appendix when discussing details of the dataset, we refer to specific 
worksheets within this workbook. 
 
Data sources and definitions 
We primarily rely on 46 sources, which are listed in the worksheet titled  “bibliography” 
and the worksheet titled “web.” Many of these are scholarly books about particular regions or 
countries and some are atlases. As a few examples, Robert Wells wrote The Population of the 
British Colonies in America before 1776; Simeon Ominde wrote The Population of Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda; and, McEvedy and Jones assembled Atlas of World Population History. 
We also use primary sources (such as national and colonial censuses) to both check these sources 
and to expand the number of countries and data points. Besides the books and official documents 
listed in the worksheet “bibliography,” some datasets are provided online. We list these in the 
worksheet “web.” 
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In terms of defining “European settlers,” we strive in collecting the data to identify 
Europeans as people from the geographic region of Europe; it is NOT a racial or ethnic 
description. So, some observers might consider the populations of some countries outside of 
Europe as racially or ethnically equivalent to Europeans, but that is irrelevant to us. We are only 
concerned with resettlement from Europe to outside Europe, defined geographically. 
Furthermore, in assembling the data on settlers, we strive to exclude colonial officials or business 
people that are temporarily stationed abroad; we strive to only include Europeans who 
permanently resettle outside of Europe. 
 
Data: By country, year, and source 
For each country, we provide an entry for each year for which we found information on 
the European share of the population. For each data point, we provide the source of the 
information (including the page number) and brief notes about the data, whenever relevant.  
Some of these notes are important. For example, the 1744 and 1778 values for Argentina are 
based only on the population around Buenos Aires, for the country as a whole. Similarly, one of 
the values for Ecuador in 1781 measures only the population around Quito. These notes, the data, 
and the sources of each data point are listed in the worksheet, “country_year_source.” 
For example, Lyle N. McAlister, in Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492 -1700, 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1984) provides data on page 131 on the population of Argentina 
in 1570. He notes that there are 2000 whites, 4000 blacks, 300,000 “others” in Argentina. Since 
whites are typically used to describe people of European descent, we calculate European share in 
Argentina in 1570 as 0.0065.  
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In some cases, the data sources provide a range of years (rather than a single year) 
corresponding to data on the share of the population that is European. For example, one of the 
observations on Mexico is listed as 1568-1570 in the underlying data.  In these cases, we choose 
the average of the range and enter this as the year for the observation.  Thus, for the Mexico 
example, we choose the year 1569 when entering the data. All of these cases are separately 
identified in the worksheet “periods.” This has no bearing on our analyses, but might be relevant 
for others that use these data. 
In a few cases, we found two data sources that provide information on the same year (or 
range of years) for the same country.  In some cases, these two data sources agree, in which case 
we simply report both observations within the worksheet “country_year_sources.” In a few 
cases, the data sources give different numbers for the share of Europeans in a country in a given 
year. In this case, we report both numbers in the worksheet “country_year_sources” and use the 
average of the two observations when constructing the data on which we conduct our analyses. 
 
Data:  Share of Europeans used in the analyses 
From these data scattered over many years since the 16th century, we construct several 
measures of the share of Europeans during colonization for each country, where we have one 
measure per country. To do this, we arrange the data in a manner that is amenable for the 
construction of a single measure of the share of Europeans during colonization for each country. 
In the worksheet “euro share,” each row is a country. The columns provide possible data entries 
for many years running from 1540 (which is our first observation, for Chile) through to the late 
20th century. We do not include all years as column headings; rather, we only include years for 
which we have at least one non-missing value for one country.  
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First, we construct simple, objective measures that average the value of each country over 
particular periods. For example, we average each country’s entries over the period from 1500 to 
1801; and, we average values over the period from 1700 to 1950. These measures are provided in 
the worksheet titled “euro share.” Other researchers can obviously take these data and use 
whichever periods they find most appropriate. 
These simple, objective measures for computing the share of Europeans during 
colonization, however, have some limitations. Specifically, averaging over uniform time periods 
for all countries might not create accurate measures for each particular country of the proportion 
of the population that is European during a colony’s formative period—the period when a colony 
was creating an initial set of (potentially enduring) political, educational, and cultural 
institutions. We fully recognize that there is not a precise definition of “the” formative period of 
colonization. Nevertheless, influential studies of comparative economic development emphasize 
the potential role of Europeans during a colony’s history when it establishes major institutional 
norms. This motivates our efforts to give empirical substance to this amorphous notion.  From 
this perspective, using the European share of the population of Mexico in 1650 might be more 
appropriate than using the share in 1850, but using the European share of the population in 1650 
in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (or other parts of the world) might be inappropriate because 
European colonization evolved differently there. Thus, we face a challenging goal: account for 
these historical differences in the timing and process of colonization to construct a more 
conceptually useful measure of “euro share” for each country. We face this challenge while 
operating under severe data constraints.  
Thus, the second method for constructing a measure of each country’s European share of 
the population during the formative years of colonization attempts to select the best year, or 
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range of years, given the particulars of the country and data availability. We would like a date as 
early as possible after initial European colonization to use European settlement as an initial 
historical condition affecting subsequent developments. At the same time, we can’t pick a date 
that is too early after the start of European colonization. It was only after some process of 
conquest, disease control, and building rudimentary colonial infrastructure that it becomes 
possible to speak of a European community that might influence economic, political, and cultural 
conditions. Given these considerations, it would not make sense to use a uniform date across all 
colonies.  
Thus, we formulated the following “guidelines.” Subject to data limitations, we tried to 
constrain the timing of the European measure to be at least a century after initial European 
contact. Furthermore, we tried to choose a date that was at least 50 years before independence to 
measure the colonial period. Finally, if there were a few measures close together, we took the 
average.  
In the worksheet “euro share,” we provide a measure of each country’s European share of 
the population – euro share—that represents our assessment of the best year, or range of years, 
for measuring European share during the formative years of colonization for each particular 
country, where this assessment is almost always done subject to extreme data constraints. When 
using a range of years, we average to compute euro share. The worksheet also provides the year, 
or range of years, used to compute euro share. This second method is neither simple nor fully 
objective. Though we do our best to follow the guidelines outlined above, data limitations and 
the idiosyncrasies of colonial histories make things complex and subjective. Nevertheless, we 
believe euro share is a more accurate representation of the share of Europeans during the 
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formative years of colonization that simply averaging over a uniform time period for all former 
colonies. 
Though the excel spreadsheet “euro share” provides the details for each country, it is 
valuable to illustrate some of the constraints that we face and the choices that we made. For 
much of Latin America, Angel Rosentblat (1954) provides detailed estimates of the composition 
of the population in 1650. We have used these estimates when available. In many countries, the 
next available observation is not until a century (or more) later. For example, after 1650, the next 
observation is not until 1798 in Brazil, 1940 in Bolivia, 1777 in Mexico, and 1744 in Argentina. 
For some of these countries, we have earlier population estimates that are reported in the excel 
file. For example, we have observations in 1570 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico. But, 
following the guidelines sketched above, we determined that this was too early after Europeans 
first arrived.  
There are other problems, some of which force us to break with the “guidelines” sketched 
above. For example, the first number that we have for the United States is the 1790 census, 
which is obviously not fifty years before the country became independent. Similarly, we do not 
have data on the composition of the population before 1950 for several countries in Africa, 
including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Tunisia, and Rwanda.  Jamaica and El Salvador provide some particular challenges. For Jamaica, 
the numbers on European share of the population show considerable variability over the period 
from 1570 to 1673; but then, the numbers (provided by various sources) are quite consistent from 
1700 through 1943. So, to compute euro share, we take the average over the period from 1700-
1750. For El Salvador, there is one extremely large observation in 1796 (0.48) that deviates from 
other estimates in nearby years (e.g., 0.03 in 1807) provided by the same source (Baron Castro, 
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1942). Since (1) the estimates for euro share over the entire period with available data from 1551 
to 1950 are reasonably constant except for this one observation 1796 and (2) there seems to be a 
change in the definition of “white” for this particular year, we decided not to include this 
observation in the “euro share” worksheet. For El Salvador, therefore, we compute the average 
over the period from 1551-1807, excluding this 1796 outlier because of the change in definition. 
Data: Countries in which Europeans did not settle 
 There are many countries in which Europeans did not settle to any appreciable degree. In 
these countries, unsurprisingly, we do not find historical sources documenting the share of 
Europeans during the colonial period. Thus, we face a problem: We do not want eliminate these 
countries from the sample when we know that European settlers were not a material part of their 
history, but we do not have documentation to that effect. Thus, although we cannot strictly prove 
that there were no Europeans, available evidence suggests that Europeans did not settle 
everywhere and we can incorporate this information into our analyses. 
We follow the following procedure. We conduct a worldwide search for colonial data on 
European settlement. Besides the sources listed in the workbook, we examine many additional 
sources in search of data. When we fail to find any mention of European settlement in any of 
these sources for a given nation, we coded that country as having zero European settlement. This 
procedure runs the risk of biasing downward European settlement for these countries. But, 
colonial histories seem unlikely to ignore material European settlement. We confirm our data 
using information from Acemoglu et al. 2001 on the European share of the population in 1900. 
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Problems: A brief discussion of a few of the problems 
There are many challenges associated with constructing this database on the European 
share of the population during the period of colonization. First, although colonists did document 
the number of Europeans in the total population at various points during colonization, the 
processes and periodicities were not standardized. We just do not know if the same colonial 
power used the same methods in different countries in different years, not to mention differences 
across European powers. For example, different colonial powers probably used different 
methods to estimate population numbers. In a census-based method, there could be an 
undercount of non-European populations, which would bias population numbers downward and 
European shares upward. In a sampling methodology, there is zero expected bias only if the 
samplings were random. Unfortunately, we have almost no information on methods followed to 
get these population numbers. Put simply, we do not have a continuous time series of data 
collected using similar measures by a centralized coordinating entity. 
Second, most of the cells in the data running from the 16th century to the 20th century are 
empty. This means that for many countries we cannot get measures of the share of Europeans in 
the population within decades of the years that we would ideally want to measure euro share. 
Although most countries do not experience huge changes in the share of Europeans, some 
experience substantial changes, so this is another challenge facing the construction of the 
database. 
Third, the basic conceptual predictions about the role of Europeans during colonization 
and their enduring influence on economic development do not provide a concrete definition of 
when to measure the share of Europeans during colonization. We try to measure the share of 
Europeans about a century after the start of colonization and 50 years before independence, but 
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this simply represents the articulation of a hopefully helpful empirical guideline to measure a still 
vague concept. Without ignoring these—and other—challenges, we constructed the database and 
use it to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the share of Europeans during 
colonization and comparative economic development. 
 
